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International Investment Law and the Extractive Industries Sector  
Since the 1990s, international investment law has been rapidly evolving, resulting in a 
complex web of over 3,000 investment treaties. These treaties have been used to 
challenge a wide range of host state actions and inactions that have allegedly 
negatively affected foreign investors or investments. Those challenges, in turn, expose 
host states to potentially significant financial costs, and can restrict the ability of such 
states to maximize the benefits, and limit the environmental and social harms, that can 
result from the exploitation of natural resources. This briefing note provides an 
introduction to international investment law, with a view to assisting stakeholders in 
grasping the diverse and significant implications of this body of law for the governance 
of investments in the extractive industries sector.  
International investment law 
has important implications for 
governance of investments in 
the extractive industries sector. 
 
Investment treaties can limit a 
state’s ability to adopt, revise, 
repeal, and enforce laws and 
policies that affect foreign 
investors or investments in their 
territories. 
 Foreign investors can challenge a wide range of host state 
measures and conduct, resulting 
in potentially significant financial 
consequences for host states. 
What is international investment law 
and why does it matter for the 
extractive industries?  
International investment law plays a 
central role in governing investments in 
the extractive industries sector. 
Formed through a complex web of 
over 3,000 investment treaties 
concluded by countries around the 
world, it is typically regarded as one 
of the fastest-developing areas of 
public international law. 
Investment treaties are international 
agreements concluded between 
states that impose obligations and 
restrictions on countries regarding 
their treatment of foreign investors 
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4 
It is crucial for host states to 
understand the implications of 
international investment law, 
and to preserve the regulatory 
flexibility required to effectively 
maximize the benefits, and 
limit the environmental and 
social harms, that can result 
from the exploitation of natural 
resources. 
 Briefing Note   
 
Table of Contents 
 
International Investment Law 1                                    
Relation to Extractive Industries  3 
Investor Protections  4 
Enforcement 6 
Practical Implications 8 
Addressing Challenges  12 
Additional Resources                            13 
Annex: Examples of Key Cases           14 
2 The authors are grateful to Lisa Sachs, Sophie 
Thomashausen, and Lauren Waugh for their helpful 
comments and suggestions.   
 
 
  
2 
 
and foreign-owned investments.  These treaties are 
designed to limit the freedom of “host states” to act (or 
not act) in certain ways that harm the rights or interests 
of foreign investors who seek to invest, or who have 
invested, in the country’s territory. Consequently, when 
a state has signed an investment treaty, that state’s 
ability to adopt, revise, repeal, and enforce laws and 
policies that affect foreign investors or investments is 
made subject to the state’s obligations under that 
treaty. The treaty’s obligations generally apply to all 
branches of government (e.g., legislative, executive, 
and judicial) at all levels of the state (e.g., local, 
municipal, state/provincial, and federal). 
The impacts that investment treaties can have on 
domestic governance of foreign investments are varied 
and significant. Investment treaties have been used to 
challenge a wide range of actions and inactions that 
have allegedly negatively affected foreign investors or 
investments, including changes in tax regimes; 
changes in environmental, healthcare, and other public 
interest laws or enforcement of those laws; decisions 
to modify or remove incentives or subsidies; and 
decisions to revoke, not renew, or not grant permits for 
activities requiring government authorization.  
One area in which the impact of investment treaties is 
especially pronounced is in the domestic governance 
of extractive industries. Good governance of this 
sector requires a significant degree of state 
involvement in order to maximize the benefits, and to 
limit the environmental and social harms, that can 
result from the exploitation of natural resources. To 
maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of 
extractive industry investments, a robust framework of 
economic, environmental, and social laws and policies 
must be established, and must also be able to evolve 
over time in order to respond to changing 
circumstances, technologies, and best practices. 
As is described further below, several efforts by states 
to develop and refine their domestic legal frameworks 
governing extractive industry investments -- whether 
through legislative instruments, court decisions, 
contract provisions, or administrative actions -- have 
been challenged under investment treaties. Those 
challenges, in turn, expose host states to potentially 
significant costs in terms of litigation expenses and/or 
liabilities.1  For investments in the extractive industries 
in particular, the sums at stake can be staggering, 
diverting resources away from other domestic 
priorities.2  It is therefore crucial for host states that 
have signed or are negotiating investment treaties to 
understand the implications of those agreements, and 
to shape their treaty policies (or the policy decision not 
to conclude investment treaties) in a manner that 
leaves them the flexibility to ensure that they can 
effectively regulate extractive industry (and other) 
investments. 
How big is this issue? 
Due in particular to a frenzy of treaty-signing activity 
during the 1990s, the number of investment treaties 
jumped from under 400 in 1990 to over 3,300 in 2015.3  
These figures include bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs), multilateral agreements (such as the Energy 
Charter Treaty), and certain free trade agreements 
(FTAs), which increasingly include specific chapters on 
investment.  
 
 
 
 
In recent years, the pace of investment treaty-
negotiations has slowed, but still continues to grow by 
approximately one agreement signed every two 
weeks.4  
                                                 
1 See “How are investment treaties enforced?” at p. 6 below. 
2 See Table 2 “Examples of Awards and Expenses for Litigation and Arbitration in 
Extractive Industry ISDS Cases” at p. 11, and Annex: Examples of ISDS Cases 
Concerning the Extractive Industries Sector at p. 14 below. 
3 These figures reflect agreements that were signed and/or in force by the close of 
1990 and 2015 respectively, per the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) International Investment Agreements Navigator, accessible 
at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA.     
4 UNCTAD, “Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS” (IIA Issues Note No. 1, February 2015), 
at p. 1 <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf>.   
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Moreover, there has been a rise in the negotiation of 
“mega-treaties” such as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), which involve a 
number of countries; in total, 88 countries 
participated in the negotiation of seven “mega-
treaties” in 2014.5  Thus, while treaty signing may 
have slowed, the influence of international 
investment law continues to grow.  
How does international investment law relate to 
the regulation of extractive industries? 
Foreign investors have relied on investment treaties 
to challenge a range of government conduct with 
regard to the establishment, approval, operation, and 
termination of investments in extractive industries. 
As of September 2015, 667 known treaty-based 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases had 
been lodged; at least 16% of these cases concerned 
investments in extractive industries, making this 
sector the second most disputed in international 
investment arbitration (see Figure 2).6  
 
 
Of the 229 known treaty-based cases that were 
pending as of September 2015, 45 related to the 
extractive industries (or just shy of 20%). These 
                                                 
5 UNCTAD, “Investment Policy Monitor No. 13” (January 2015), at p. 10, note 97 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d13_en.pdf>. Of these 
negotiations, only two have had concluded by December 2015, namely those 
concerning the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the European Union-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). 
6 This analysis is based on the information available through UNCTAD’s Investment 
Dispute Settlement Navigator, accessible at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (updated as of September 1, 2015). 
cases include 27 related to mining and quarrying, 
and 18 related to the extraction of crude petroleum 
and gas. 
A significant majority of extractives cases are filed 
against developing countries, where nascent 
regulatory frameworks can be subject to change as 
governments seek to find the correct balance 
between attracting investment and encouraging 
sustainable development.  Ninety percent of 
extractives cases were brought against a country 
with a GNI of less than $12,736 (and 84% of the 
pending extractives cases as of September 2015). 7  
Among the cases concerning investments in the 
extractive industries sector, the following types of 
government acts and omissions have been 
challenged by investors:8   
– New and stronger environmental regulations (e.g. 
Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States; Lone Pine 
Resources Inc. v. Canada);  
– Termination of contracts with investors (e.g. 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental 
Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador 
2012);  
– Revocation/ termination of permits authorizing 
investors’ operations (e.g. The Renco Group, Inc. 
v. Peru; Gold Reserve Inc. v. Venezuela);  
– Decisions not to grant permits (e.g. Pac Rim 
Cayman LLC v. El Salvador; Clayton and Bilcon of 
Delaware Inc. v. Canada);  
– Changes to fiscal regimes (including changes in 
interpretations of and enforcement strategies for 
existing laws and regulations) (e.g. Occidental 
Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador 
2004; Perenco Ecuador Limited v. Ecuador); 
– Requirements to purchase local goods and 
services/invest in research and development (e.g., 
Mobil Investments Canada, Inc. v. Canada); 
                                                 
7 This analysis is based on the information available through UNCTAD’s Investment 
Dispute Settlement Navigator, accessible at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (updated as of September 1, 2015). 
10% were brought against low-income countries, i.e. those with a gross national 
income (GNI) per capita of $1,045 or less in 2014; 32% were brought against lower-
middle income countries, i.e. those with a GNI per capita between $1,045 and 
$4,125 in 2014; and 48% were brought against upper-middle income countries, i.e. 
those with a GNI per capita between $4,125 and $12,736 in 2014. GNI brackets 
and country classifications are based on World Bank lending categories for the 
2016 fiscal year. For further information, see here: 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups. 
8 Further information on these and other relevant cases can be found in the Annex, 
at p. 14 below. 
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– Moratoria on issuing permits (e.g., Lone Pine v. 
Canada; Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador); 
– Conduct during negotiation or renegotiation of 
contracts (e.g., PSEG v. Turkey).  
 
What kinds of protections does international 
investment law provide?  
Investment treaties impose obligations on the host 
state regarding its treatment of foreign investors and 
foreign-owned investments. While the specific 
protections and obligations created by investment 
treaties will depend on the text of the relevant treaty, 
a number of core provisions can commonly be found 
in investment treaties signed by resource-rich 
countries. The descriptions below of those core 
provisions provide general contours regarding the 
meaning of key treaty obligations. However, there is 
considerable uncertainty regarding the precise 
content of these treaty standards; tribunals have 
adopted different interpretations of the core 
provisions, and as there is no system of precedent in 
ISDS, tribunals are not required to aim for 
consistency in interpreting and applying these 
standards. 
 
Non-Discrimination 
The obligation not to discriminate among or between 
investors is found in almost all investment treaties. It 
usually consists of two relative standards, which 
require that the host state treat foreign investors no 
less favorably than: (1) domestic investors (also 
referred to as the “national treatment” obligation); 
and (2) other foreign investors (also referred to as 
the “most-favored nation”, or MFN, treatment 
obligation).  
 
The national treatment obligation can be used to 
challenge various measures that intentionally 
discriminate against foreign investors in favor of 
domestic individuals and entities, which may include 
restrictions on foreign ownership of land in all or 
some areas of the country; restrictions on total or 
partial foreign ownership of firms engaged in certain 
sectors or activities; tax rules that differentiate 
between firms based on the location of their 
beneficial owners or headquarters; and incentives, 
subsidies or other privileges that are limited to 
locally-owned firms (e.g., preferences accorded to 
firms owned by indigenous peoples, and local 
procurement schemes). More controversially, the 
national treatment obligation has also been used to 
challenge situations of unintentional discrimination, 
such as when a law - or enforcement of that law - 
has a negative impact on a foreign investor, but was 
not designed nor applied to target the investor based 
on its nationality.  
In addition to prohibiting intentional and even 
unintentional discrimination against covered foreign 
investors, the MFN obligation has been interpreted to 
allow covered foreign investors from one country to 
“import” more favorable provisions from an 
investment treaty signed between the host state and 
another country. This can open up an array of 
options to investors, allowing them to “cherry-pick” 
preferred provisions from the multitude of 
agreements that a host state has signed.9   
Expropriation  
Expropriation generally falls into two categories: 
direct and indirect. Direct expropriation involves “the 
physical taking or nationalization of an enterprise, 
which usually involves a transfer of ownership to the 
state.” 10  Indirect expropriation is generally 
understood as an action or measure taken by the 
state that has the effect of depriving the investor of 
the benefit of its investment, while not resulting in the 
transfer of ownership. Investment treaties typically 
recognize that governments may lawfully expropriate 
property, but require that any expropriation must be 
promptly, adequately, and effectively compensated.  
It is usually easy to identify whether there has been a 
direct expropriation. In such cases, the more difficult 
question often relates to the appropriate measure of 
compensation. In contrast, indirect expropriation can 
be much more difficult to identify, given the fine line 
that separates an indirect expropriation from the 
legitimate exercise of a state’s bona fide regulatory 
power that may result in effects similar to those 
resulting from expropriation (e.g. elimination of all, or 
                                                 
9  Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Aaron Cosbey, Lise Johnson, Damon Vis-
Dunbar, Investment Treaties and Why They Matter to Sustainable Development: 
Questions & Answers (IISD, 2012), at p. 26 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/investment_treaties_why_they_matter_sd.pdf>. 
10 Ibid, at p. 15. 
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substantially all, of the value of an investment). 
Investment tribunals have adopted a variety of 
different tests to decide whether a measure or series 
of measures amounts to an expropriation, making it 
difficult for states to determine how proposed actions 
will be judged by a tribunal. Notably, even if a state’s 
domestic legal system governs and requires 
compensation for indirect expropriations, and a 
domestic court has determined that a challenged 
measure does not constitute an indirect 
expropriation, an ISDS tribunal may still find that the 
same measure constituted an indirect expropriation 
under international investment law. 
Fair and Equitable Treatment  
Virtually all modern investment treaties contain a 
provision requiring the host state to accord “fair and 
equitable treatment” (FET) to investments. Tribunals 
have struggled to interpret and apply this vague 
standard, as most treaties typically give no clear 
guidance regarding its meaning. Some tribunals 
have adopted a relatively narrow approach, 
concluding that states will only be liable if their 
conduct is egregious and shocking.11  Others have 
interpreted the provision much more broadly, 
establishing a high standard that requires host states 
not to act in a manner that affects the “basic” or 
“legitimate expectations” that were taken into 
account by the foreign investor when making the 
investment.12   
Investors have relied extensively on this broad 
interpretation of FET in challenging the conduct of 
host states. Indeed, this provision has become a 
“catch-all” clause, allowing investors to succeed 
where their other claims (for example in relation to 
expropriation) fail.13 
Umbrella Clause  
Some investment treaties contain a provision, 
typically referred to as an “umbrella clause”, which 
                                                 
11 See e.g. Glamis Gold v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, June 8, 2009. 
12 See e.g. Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, May 29, 
2003, para.154 (government conduct must be “free from ambiguity and totally 
transparent” so that the investor may know all the relevant rules and regulations, 
and their respective goals, before investing); and Occidental v. Ecuador, Award, 
July 1, 2004, paras. 185-186, 190-191 (the FET obligation enables review of the 
correctness of domestic court and/or administrative determinations, and requires 
“stability and predictability” and “certainly entails an obligation not to alter the legal 
and business environment in which the investment has been made”). 
13 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Cosbey, Johnson, Vis-Dunbar (n 9), at p. 12. 
can require the host state to comply with certain 
obligations or commitments owed to (or entered into 
with) investors or investments. 14  The precise 
meaning and effect of these provisions, so-named 
because of their ability to bring various obligations 
within the “umbrella” of the investment treaty, is the 
subject of considerable debate. Any clear 
interpretation of the umbrella clause remains elusive 
because the specific wording of these clauses often 
varies from agreement to agreement, and even 
clauses with identical wording have been given 
different interpretations by arbitral tribunals. 
According to some tribunals, investors can use 
umbrella clauses to enforce any obligation owed by 
the state, which can include obligations owed under 
other areas of international law, general domestic 
law, or under specific investor-state contracts. Other 
tribunals have interpreted the provision more 
narrowly, concluding that umbrella clauses only allow 
an investor to enforce obligations owed specifically 
to it under an investor-state contract.   
Restrictions on Performance Requirements 
A performance requirement “is a condition that 
investors must meet in order to establish or operate 
a business, or to obtain some advantage offered by 
the host state.”15  Examples include mandatory or 
incentive-based requirements that investors: (1) use 
or accord a preference to local providers of goods or 
services; (2) make expenditures in the host country 
on research and development or education and 
training; or (3) hire a certain number or percentage of 
local employees. Such requirements can and are 
often used by host states to establish and strengthen 
the linkages between foreign investors and the 
domestic economy that can help encourage 
technology transfer, increase domestic employment, 
and promote economic diversification.16 While World 
Trade Organization (WTO) law imposes some 
restrictions on its member states’ use of performance 
requirements, those restrictions primarily focus on 
preventing member states’ use of performance 
                                                 
14  It seems that states have become increasingly reluctant to include such 
provisions in newly drafted treaties: of the treaties concluded in 2014, all omitted 
such a clause. See UNCTAD, “Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS” (IIA Issues Note 
No. 1, February 2015), at p. 3 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf>.   
15 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Cosbey, Johnson, Vis-Dunbar (n 9), at p. 27. 
16 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Cosbey, Johnson, Vis-Dunbar (n 9), at p. 27-28. 
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requirements, those restrictions primarily focus on preventing member states from favoring domestic over foreign-
produced goods, and leave member states a considerable amount of policy space to adopt other performance 
requirements. A growing number of investment treaties, however, impose greater restrictions on states’ use of 
those policy tools, and allow investors to enforce those restrictions through ISDS. These investment treaty 
provisions limit the number of options available to states to try to ensure that foreign investment produces 
development benefits in the host state. 
How are investment treaties enforced?  
The obligations established by investment treaties can be enforced by investors through investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) provisions, which are included in the text of most treaties. ISDS allows a vast range of investors 
to bring claims directly against host states, seeking damages for alleged injuries, typically without either the 
permission or knowledge of the investor’s own state (the “home state”). This differs from other areas of 
international law, such as under the WTO’s agreements, in which only states are given the ability to challenge 
other states for violating their treaty commitments. 
 
ISDS also differs in several important ways from the dispute settlement mechanisms typically found in domestic 
court systems (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Differences between Proceedings in Domestic Court Systems and in ISDS 
 
 Domestic Court System ISDS 
Who can bring a claim? Domestic law and/or any relevant contract 
determine who can bring claims; they can allow, 
e.g.: 
‒ claims by states against investors; 
‒ claims by investors against states; and 
‒ claims by citizens/communities against 
investors (and against states regarding a 
state’s regulation, or failure to regulate, 
investors). 
Only investors, or other shareholders, 
covered by an investment treaty can bring 
claims against states. 
 
States cannot initiate ISDS claims against 
investors. 
Who decides the claim? Judges Private arbitrators, typically appointed by the 
parties to the dispute 
Where are cases decided? In administrative tribunals or courts, located in the 
host country 
In proceedings often conducted outside of 
the host country. Common sites of arbitration 
are The Hague, London, Paris, Stockholm, 
and Washington, D.C. 
Are disputes open to the 
public? Do they allow 
public participation? 
Court proceedings in domestic legal systems are 
often open to the public, permitting the public to 
attend proceedings, access court decisions, and 
access filings made by parties (though there are 
also often mechanisms to protect against public 
disclosure of confidential information). 
 
In some systems, interested and/or affected 
individuals or entities have the possibility to:  
‒ make amicus curiae submissions; and/or 
‒ join disputes as a party. 
Under the vast majority of treaties, ISDS 
proceedings can be closed to the public. 
 
Some tribunals have allowed interested or 
affected individuals or entities to participate 
as amicus curiae. 
 
Non-parties to the dispute, including 
individuals or entities that will be affected by 
its outcome, do not have the right to 
participate as amicus curiae, or the ability to 
join the proceedings.  
What substantive law is 
applied? 
Domestic law (which may also incorporate 
international law).  
 
The law of the treaty, which is the treaty itself 
and any other applicable law specified in the 
treaty.  
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If there is a contract, the law specified in the 
contract (commonly the law of the host state) will 
also be applied. 
 
When deciding contract-based disputes, the 
tribunal will apply the law of the contract, and 
may also apply principles of international law 
to the contract. 
What procedural law is 
applied? 
Domestic procedural law will apply to address 
potentially outcome-determinative issues such as: 
‒ who has standing to bring claims; 
‒ whether claims are ripe; 
‒ whether claims are timely or have been 
filed too late; and 
‒ whether evidence is admissible. 
ISDS proceedings are governed by rules 
specified in the relevant investment treaty 
and any applicable rules of arbitration.  
 
Domestic rules of procedure do not govern 
ISDS proceedings.  
What are the remedies? Remedies are generally specified in domestic law 
or contract, and can include  
‒ injunctive relief (e.g., telling the 
government to take or not take a certain 
action)  
‒ declaratory relief (e.g., declaring that a 
particular government action violates 
domestic law);  
‒ specific performance (e.g., ordering an 
investor to comply with the terms of the 
contract);  
‒ restitution (e.g., ordering that property be 
returned to the investor);  
‒ compensation (e.g., ordering the 
government to pay the investor for losses 
caused by the government’s conduct); 
and 
‒ punitive damages (e.g., ordering the 
investor to pay the government an 
amount that reflects a penalty for wrongful 
conduct). 
Remedies are usually limited to 
compensation. Some treaties specifically 
preclude any other remedies.  
Is there a possibility of 
appeal? 
Domestic legal systems often provide some 
mechanisms for appeal. Errors of fact and/or law 
by a lower court or tribunal are common bases for 
appeal.  
Decisions and/or awards are not subject to 
appeal. They can only be challenged on 
specific, narrow grounds. Awards generally 
cannot be challenged on the ground that the 
tribunal made an error of fact or law.  
 
 
 
 
 
Who and what do investments treaties protect? 
Whether a particular treaty protects a specific 
investor or investment will depend on the wording of 
the treaty itself.  
Often, covered investors are defined simply to 
include any person who is a national of the home 
state and any company that is incorporated in the 
home state (even if that company is a shell company 
owned by investors from a third state). This broad 
type of definition can result in host state government 
measures being challenged by a vast range of 
individuals and/or entities. A single measure 
affecting one investment can give rise to multiple 
claims by different direct and indirect investors in that 
investment, including by foreign holding companies 
or shareholders involved in locally incorporated 
projects. Even if the host state settles a legal dispute 
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with the locally incorporated project company, 
foreign investors and shareholders  in that company 
can still pursue separate legal claims through ISDS. 
Particularly for developing countries, having to 
defend multiple suits can constitute a significant 
drain on host state resources.  
Broad definitions of covered investors can also allow 
for “treaty shopping”: in order to qualify as a covered 
investor, a company may route its investment 
through a shell company in order to benefit from the 
protections of a particular country’s treaty.  
“Investments” covered by investment treaties also 
tend to be broadly defined, with many treaties stating 
that “any kind of asset” owned or controlled by a 
foreign investor can qualify as a protected 
investment. Such a definition can include a parent 
company’s foreign subsidiary in the host country, but 
can also include a much broader range of rights and 
interests including rights granted under a contract, 
permit, or license; shares in a foreign company; 
loans to a foreign company or to the host state itself; 
intellectual property rights; and even “goodwill.” 
Some states, commentators, and tribunals have 
taken the position that to qualify as a protected 
“investment,” an asset must have certain 
fundamental characteristics, including that it 
represents a long-term commitment of capital or 
resources, and makes a significant contribution to 
the host state’s development. Most tribunals, 
however, have rejected such arguments, declining to 
impose any restrictions on the definition of protected 
“investments” that are not clearly set forth in the 
treaty itself.17   
What are the practical implications of this regime 
for governments seeking to regulate investment 
in extractive industries? 
The investor protections created by investment 
treaties, coupled with the manner in which they have 
been interpreted and applied by investment tribunals, 
can result in claims against, and liability for, host 
states seeking to improve their governance of 
extractive resources. Efforts by states to renegotiate 
investor-state contracts, amend their legal 
                                                 
17 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Cosbey, Johnson, Vis-Dunbar (n 9), at p. 10. 
frameworks, cancel illegal deals, and adopt 
performance requirements designed to help leverage 
extractive industry investments for sustainable 
development can all give rise to risks of expensive 
arbitrations under investment treaties.   
 
Renegotiation of investor-state contracts: Investment 
contracts for extractive industry projects often run for 
terms of 10-30 years or more; over that time horizon, 
there is a great deal of political, geological, and 
market uncertainty, and a high likelihood of changed 
circumstances. Consequently, these contracts are 
often renegotiated at the request of the investor, 
state, or both. Investment treaties may impose 
burdensome obligations on or limit host-state 
conduct (but not investor conduct) with respect to 
renegotiations.18  As a result, host states may find 
themselves effectively bound to the original terms of 
outdated deals that do not align with their interests, 
while investors retain greater powers and flexibility to 
seek renegotiations or terminate contracts when the 
original contracts no longer serve their interests.    
                                                 
18 See, e.g., PSEG v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, January 19, 2007; 
Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, March 17, 2006; Teco 
Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, 
Award, December 19, 2013; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/17, Award, June 21, 2011; Vivendi v. Argentina (II), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19, Award, April 9, 2015; Siemens AG v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8, Award, February 6, 2007; AES v. Hungary (II), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/22, Award, September 23, 2010; RDC v. Guatemala, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/23, Second Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, May 18, 2010; Biwater 
Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Award, July 24, 2008. 
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Reduced flexibility to develop and implement the 
necessary legal framework: New laws or measures 
adopted by governments to govern extractive 
industry investments, including by increasing taxes 
or strengthening environmental protection, have 
been challenged under investment treaties on the 
ground that they indirectly expropriated the investor’s 
property or violated the FET provision. 19  Court or 
administrative decisions interpreting and applying 
such laws in ways that negatively impact foreign 
investors (including administrative decisions to 
revoke, not grant, or not renew permits) have also 
been challenged under investment treaties.20  
                                                 
19  See, e.g., Glamis Gold v. United States; Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. 
Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/12; Perenco Ecuador Limited v. 
Republic of Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6; Burlington 
Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Liability, December 14, 2012. 
20 See, e.g., Occidental v. Ecuador (2004); Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. 
Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability, March 17, 2015; Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, June 
1, 2012). 
Similarly, actions taken by governments to enforce 
laws against foreign investors have triggered 
investment treaty claims on the grounds that the 
measures were tantamount to expropriations, 
violated the FET obligation, or discriminated against 
the foreign investors. 21  Under investment treaties, 
the fact that a measure was adopted in good faith 
and for a legitimate, public interest purpose generally 
does not operate as a defense to claims, nor does 
the fact that a measure is consistent with (or even 
required under) domestic law. Consequently, 
governments attempting to develop, refine, 
strengthen, and enforce their legal frameworks 
governing extractive industries may face exposure to 
claims and liability when those actions negatively 
affect the rights, or even the mere “expectations”, of 
foreign investors.  
Illegal investments or contractual provisions: Where 
a host-state government enters into an investment 
contract in breach of the law, for example through an 
ultra vires act of the government (i.e. one that was 
beyond its power or authority), such a contract will 
often be deemed void ab initio (or void “from the 
beginning”), voidable, or unenforceable in domestic 
legal systems (irrespective of whether the 
government was knowingly or negligently at fault). 
Some ISDS tribunals have, however, determined 
that when a state or state-owned entity is involved in 
or aware of the illegality of a particular investor-state 
contract, the government is estopped or precluded 
from later arguing that the illegality rendered the 
contract null and void and unenforceable under the 
investment treaty.22 By binding governments to illegal 
or ultra vires contracts, tribunals can override 
domestic law norms and give legal force to rights 
that would not otherwise exist under the domestic 
legal framework.  
 
 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Burlington v. Ecuador; The Renco Group, Inc. v. Republic of Peru, 
ICSID Case No. UNCT/13/1. 
22 See e.g. Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, July 6, 2007; RDC v. Guatemala. Note that some tribunals have 
determined that an investor cannot benefit from the protections of an investment 
treaty if there is evidence that the investor procured its investment through fraud or 
corruption. Tribunals have otherwise bound governments to contracts whose 
illegality arises from other grounds, including ultra vires conduct. 
Box 1: Asymmetric obligations in PSEG v. Turkey  
The dispute concerned the development of a mining and 
power plant project, for which a preliminary contract had 
been initialed by the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources following their approval of the investor’s 
feasibility study. While awaiting completion of the next step 
in the contract’s government approval process, the investor 
revised its mining plan and made several changes to its 
proposed project which would increase the government’s 
potential liability and reduce the government’s tax revenue, 
rendering the project less attractive for the government. 
Although the preliminary contract was approved (based on 
the original feasibility study), the government sought to 
renegotiate the contract due to some of the investor’s 
changed plans. Ultimately, the renegotiations failed. The 
ISDS tribunal concluded that, although the government had 
not behaved in “bad faith”, the government had acted 
“negligent[ly]”, and its “attitudes and policies” regarding the 
project had changed during its interactions with the investor. 
According to the tribunal, this was sufficient to constitute a 
breach of the FET obligation. The tribunal ordered the 
government to compensate the investor for costs expended 
from the submission of its feasibility study through continued 
negotiations to develop the project, i.e. pre-contract and pre-
project expenses. Turkey was thus required to pay the 
investor US$ 9 million plus interest, and bear 65% of the 
US$ 21 million in arbitration costs.  
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Similarly, investment contracts may contain 
provisions (e.g., broad stabilization provisions or 
arbitration clauses), governed by the host state’s 
law, which a domestic court would deem void or 
unenforceable on the basis that the provisions are 
contrary to public policy, domestic law, or another 
ground. Investment tribunals, however, do not have 
the same mandate or authority to develop and/or 
apply domestic law and consequently may bind a 
host state government to contractual provisions that 
would be invalid and unenforceable under that 
state’s domestic law. 
Limits on tools to leverage investment for sustainable 
development: The restrictions placed by many 
investment treaties on the use of performance 
requirements remove an essential means for host 
governments to try to ensure that the development 
resulting from investment is sustainable and socially 
inclusive, benefiting not only the investor but also the 
citizens of the host state. Investment tribunals have 
further strengthened restrictions on performance 
requirements by adopting broad interpretations of 
their scope (see Box 2). 
 
 
“Internationalization” of host-state obligations: The 
ability of an “umbrella clause” to bring a domestic law 
or contractual issue under the umbrella of an 
investment treaty has a number of legal and practical 
consequences. It can, for instance: 
– Remove disputes regarding breach of domestic law or 
investor-state contracts from domestic courts that would 
otherwise have the authority to interpret the relevant 
legal provisions and decide those cases: this, in turn, 
reduces the role of domestic courts in developing and 
shaping the law; 
– Affect who is entitled to defend the case: in ISDS 
disputes, arbitration proceedings are often handled by a 
particular government entity at the federal level that may 
be different from the local, state, provincial or federal 
government entity whose conduct gave rise to the 
dispute; the different government entities may have 
different perspectives regarding which arguments to 
raise, and whether and on what terms to settle the 
dispute; 
– Affect who can gain access to information about or 
participate in the dispute: ISDS typically takes place in 
proceedings outside of the host state and often in a 
foreign language; the proceedings often are not 
transparent, and provide only limited avenues for other 
stakeholders, such as affected citizens, to follow and 
make submissions in disputes;  
– Alter the substantive rules that would be applied to 
decide the case and the remedies available for breach;  
– Affect the availability of appeals: while domestic 
proceedings often allow court decisions to be appealed 
to one or more courts of higher authority, investor-state 
proceedings do not similarly permit such challenges. 
 
Financial liability: The financial implications of ISDS 
can be significant. Host-state respondents stand to 
suffer financially whether they win or lose, owing to 
the substantial costs of arbitral proceedings (see 
Table 2).  
 
 
Box 2: Broad interpretations of restrictions in Mobil v. 
Canada 
Following the discovery of oil fields off the coast of 
Newfoundland, Canada, the government put in place a legal 
regime designed to require investors engaging in 
development of the offshore resources to make 
expenditures for research and development (R&D) and 
education and training (E&T) in the local province. These 
and other requirements were enacted in the 1987 “Accord 
Act”. When Canada concluded the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it listed the Accord Act as an 
exception to the treaty’s restrictions on performance 
requirements. The NAFTA also included within that 
exception any “subordinate measure adopted or maintained 
under the authority of and consistent with the [Accord Act]”. 
Pursuant to the Act, Canadian officials subsequently issued 
guidelines that sought to impose additional and stronger 
requirements with regard to company expenditures on R&D 
and E&T. Mobil objected, arguing that the new guidelines 
violated the NAFTA’s prohibitions on performance 
requirements, and were not covered by the NAFTA’s 
exceptions. The ISDS tribunal agreed, adopting a broad 
view of the restrictions on performance requirements 
contained in the NAFTA, and a correspondingly narrow view 
of the relevant exceptions thereto.  
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Table 2: Examples of Awards and Expenses for Litigation and Arbitration in Extractive Industry ISDS Cases 
 
 
Case Name and Number Amount respondent state ordered to pay to claimant 
Amount expressed as 
a percentage of host 
state GDP23 
Amount in legal/expert 
fees and arbitration costs 
borne by the host state 
Khan Resources v. Mongolia (PCA Case 
No. 2011-09) 
  
Damages: USD 80 million, plus 
interest 
 
Litigation and arbitration fees 
and costs: USD 9 million   
Damages: 0.67% GDP Unknown 
Anatolie and Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group 
S.A., Terra Raf Trans Trading Ltd v. 
Kazakhstan (SCC Case No. Case No. 
116/2010) 
Damages: USD 508 million, 
plus interest  
 
Litigation and arbitration fees 
and costs: USD 9.8 million 
Damages: 0.23% GDP USD 17.8 million  
Tidewater Investment SRL and Tidewater 
Caribe, C.A. v. Venezuela (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/5)  
Damages: USD 46.4 million 
 
Litigation and arbitration fees 
and costs: USD 2.5 million   
Damages: 0.012% GDP USD 9.5 million  
Gold Reserve Inc. v. Venezuela (ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1)  
Damages: USD 713 million, 
plus interest 
  
Litigation and arbitration fees 
and costs: USD 5 million   
Damages: 0.19% GDP USD 13 million in 
legal/expert fees and costs 
  
½ of the costs of the 
arbitration: Unknown 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation and 
Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company v. Ecuador (II) (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/06/11) 
Damages: USD 1.1 billion, plus 
interest24  
Damages: 1.09% GDP Arbitration proceedings: 
Unknown 
  
Annulment proceedings: 
USD 5.1 million  
Yukos Cases ((1) Hulley Enterprises Ltd. 
v. Russian Federation (PCA Case No. AA 
226); (2) Veteran Petroleum Limited v. 
Russia (PCA Case No. AA 228); and (3) 
Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. 
Russia (PCA Case No. AA 227))  
Damages: USD 50 billion, plus 
interest 
  
Litigation and arbitration fees 
and costs: USD 71.5 million  
Damages: 2.69% GDP USD 27 million 
Vannessa Ventures Ltd v. Venezuela 
(ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/6)  
None – state prevailed in 
dispute 
N/A  Over USD 15 million 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Calculations based on host state gross domestic product (GDP) for 2014, per World Bank figures, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table.  
24 This amount was reduced in annulment proceedings from an original award of USD 1.8 billion, plus interest. 
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What can host-state governments do to address these challenges?  
The means available to address the challenges described in this briefing note will depend on the specific 
circumstances of each state. With regard to new treaties, it is critically important that states thoroughly consider 
their reasons for signing investment treaties, and carefully define the scope and content of these agreements in 
order to protect their ability to regulate in the public interest. With regard to existing treaties, states have three 
primary options for reform: (1) termination of the relevant treaty (or treaties),25 (2) negotiation of amendments to 
the treaty, and (3) proactively clarifying their interpretations of vague and potentially expansive treaty provisions.26 
In all cases, states should be cognizant of the varied and significant implications of international investment law 
for the governance of investments in the extractive industries sector, and of the ways in which this rapidly 
expanding body of law can influence whether, when, and how foreign investment in this sector contributes to 
sustainable development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 In 2014, South Africa terminated its BITs with Austria, Denmark and Germany, and Indonesia terminated 18 of its 64 BITs. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: 
Reforming International Investment Governance (2015), <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf>.   
26 See, e.g., Lise Johnson & Merim Razbaeva, State Control over Interpretation of Investment Treaties (CCSI, 2014), at <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/04/State-Control-over-
Interpretation-of-Investment-FINAL-8.13.14.pdf>. 
 
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
(CCSI), a joint center of Columbia Law School and 
the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is a 
leading research center and forum dedicated 
exclusively to the study, practice and discussion of 
sustainable international investment (SII) worldwide. 
Through research, advisory projects, multi-
stakeholder dialogue and educational programs, 
CCSI constructs and implements an investment 
framework that promotes sustainable development, 
builds trusting relationships for long-term 
investments, and is easily adopted by governments, 
companies and civil society. 
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Additional Resources  
Websites and Tools  
www.ccsi.columbia.edu - the Columbia Center on 
Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a joint center of Columbia 
Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, 
is the only university-based applied research center and 
forum dedicated to the study, practice and discussion of 
sustainable international investment.  
 
www.resourcegovernance.org - the Natural Resource 
Governance Institute (NRGI) helps people to realize the 
benefits of their countries’ endowments of oil, gas and 
minerals through technical advice, advocacy, applied 
research, policy analysis, and capacity development.  
 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA - the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) has developed an International Investment 
Agreements Navigator, providing access to many of the 
more than 3,000 investment treaties in existence.  
 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS - UNCTAD 
recently launched a revamped Investment Dispute 
Settlement Navigator, allowing users to search for and 
access documents relating to investment disputes.  
 
www.italaw.com - database that provides access to 
investment treaties and documents relating to investment 
disputes.  
 
www.iisd.org/itn/ - news and commentary on 
developments in international investment law, from the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).  
 
www.iareporter.com - news and analysis service focusing 
on international arbitrations between foreign investors and 
their host governments.  
 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ - the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes’ (ICSID) website, which 
allows users to learn more about ICSID arbitrations and 
search for cases.  
 
www.resourcecontracts.org - an online repository of 
publicly available mining and petroleum investor-state 
contracts, developed by CCSI, the World Bank, and NRGI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Publications  
Sarah Anderson and Manuel Perez-Rocha, “Mining for 
Profits” (Institute for Policy Studies, 2013), available at 
http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Mining-
for-Profits-2013-ENGLISH.pdf.   
 
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Aaron Cosbey, Lise 
Johnson, Damon Vis-Dunbar, Investment Treaties and 
Why They Matter to Sustainable Development: Questions 
& Answers (IISD, 2012), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/investment_treaties_why_the
y_matter_sd.pdf.  
 
Lorenzo Cotula, Foreign investment, law and sustainable 
development: A handbook on agriculture and extractive 
industries (IIED, 2013), available at 
http://pubs.iied.org/17513IIED.html.   
 
Lise Johnson, “Investment Treaties and Industrial Policy: 
Select Case Studies on State Liability for Efforts to 
Encourage, Shape and Regulate Economic Activities in 
Extractive Industries and Infrastructure” (Presentation to 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 
February 19, 2014), available at 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2016/01/06/investment-treaties-
and-industrial-policy-select-case-studies-on-state-liability-
for-efforts-to-encourage-shape-and-regulate-economic-
activities-in-extractive-industries-and-infrastructure/. 
 
Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them 
(2014), available at 
http://www.resourcecontracts.org/page/resources.  
 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming 
International Investment Governance (2015), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf.   
 
UNCTAD, “Investment Policy Monitor No. 13 (January 
2015)”, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d
13_en.pdf.  
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Annex: Examples of ISDS Cases Concerning the Extractive Industries Sector27 
 
Case Title Year initiated 
Respondent 
state 
Home State 
of investor 
Legal 
Instrument 
Arbitration 
Rules 
Outcome/ 
Status of 
proceedings 
Brief description 
of investment Summary of claim 
Damages 
awarded in 
favor of 
investor(s) 
(excl. interest, 
fees and costs) 
Lone Pine 
Resources Inc. v. 
Canada (ICSID 
Case No. 
UNCT/15/2) 
2013 Canada United States 
of America 
NAFTA UNCITRAL Pending Rights under oil and 
gas exploration 
permits held by a 
wholly-owned 
Canadian 
subsidiary.  
Claims arising out of the 
revocation by the 
Government of Quebec of 
claimant's permits for 
petroleum and natural gas 
exploration in the Utica shale 
gas basin, including beneath 
the St. Lawrence River. 
Case pending  
Khan Resources 
Inc., Khan 
Resources B.V. 
and Cauc Holding 
Company Ltd. v. 
the Government of 
Mongolia and 
Monatom Co., Ltd. 
2011 Mongolia Canada; 
Netherlands; 
British Virgin 
Islands 
Energy 
Charter 
Treaty 
UNCITRAL In favor of 
the investor 
Majority 
shareholding in 
Mongolian joint 
venture subsidiary 
that held uranium 
mining and 
exploration licenses 
in Mongolia.  
Claims arising out of 
Mongolia’s cancellation of 
claimant's mining and 
exploration licenses for a 
uranium deposit located in 
the Dornod province in 
northeastern Mongolia. 
USD 80 million  
The Renco Group, 
Inc. v. Republic of 
Peru (ICSID Case 
No. UNCT/13/1) 
2011 Peru United States 
of America 
Peru-United 
States FTA 
UNCITRAL Pending Interests in the 
mining project of La 
Oroya held through 
a wholly-owned 
affiliate; rights under 
certain stock 
transfer agreement 
and guaranty 
agreement.  
Claims arising out of alleged 
arbitrary and unfair 
application of government 
measures and contracts 
related to interests in the 
mining operations in La 
Oroya, which Renco owned 
through its wholly-owned 
affiliate, Doe Run Peru S.R. 
LTDA. 
Case pending  
Anatolie and 
Gabriel Stati, 
2010 Kazakhstan Moldova, 
Republic of; 
Energy 
Charter 
SCC In favor of 
the investor 
Rights under certain 
subsoil use 
Claims arising out of the 
alleged campaign of 
USD 497 million 
net (USD 508 
                                                 
27 The information and descriptions contained in this Annex were sourced from UNCTAD’s Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, accessible at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS.  
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Ascom Group 
S.A., Terra Raf 
Trans Traiding Ltd 
v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan (SCC 
Case No. Case 
No. 116/2010) 
Romania; 
Gibraltar 
Treaty contracts held by 
Ascom's local 
operating 
companies, KPM 
and TNG; capital 
contributions for oil 
exploration and 
development; 
assets and 
infrastructure 
related to oil field 
operations, 
including a Liquid 
Petroleum Gas 
plant.  
harassment by the Kazakh 
State which culminated with 
the abrupt cancellation of oil 
and gas exploration contracts 
held by claimant's local 
operating companies, 
followed by the seizure of its 
Kazakh assets. 
million, less 
debts owed by 
claimant) 
Tidewater 
Investment SRL 
and Tidewater 
Caribe, C.A. v. 
Bolivarian 
Republic of 
Venezuela (ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB/10/5) 
2010 Venezuela, 
Bolivarian 
Republic of 
Barbados Barbados-
Venezuela 
BIT 
ICSID In favor of 
the investor 
Marine support 
services to the oil 
industry in 
Venezuela under 
contracts concluded 
between 
SEMARCA, an 
enterprise owned by 
Tidewater, and 
Venezuelan state-
owned companies.  
Claims arising out of the 
government's enactment of a 
law reserving to the State the 
assets and services related to 
primary activities of 
hydrocarbons and the seizure 
of claimants' marine support 
services operations and 
assets in Lake Maracaibo and 
the Gulf of Paria, including 
fifteen vessels. 
USD 46.4 million 
Chevron 
Corporation and 
Texaco Petroleum 
Company v. The 
Republic of 
Ecuador (PCA 
Case No. 2009-
23) (II) 
2009 Ecuador United States 
of America 
Ecuador-
US BIT 
UNCITRAL Pending Oil exploration and 
production rights in 
Ecuador’s Amazon 
region through 
concession 
contracts concluded 
with the 
government.  
Claims arising out of Texaco's 
historical participation as a 
minority member of a 
consortium with Ecuador and 
Ecuador's oil company 
Petroecuador that explored 
for and produced oil under 
concession contracts, and the 
government's alleged 
misconduct in subsequent 
litigation proceedings against 
Texaco for environmental 
remediation. 
Case pending  
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Gold Reserve Inc. 
v. Bolivarian 
Republic of 
Venezuela (ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB(AF)/09/1) 
2009 Venezuela, 
Bolivarian 
Republic of 
Canada Canada-
Venezuela 
BIT 
ICSID AF In favor of 
the investor 
Mining rights held 
indirectly by 
claimant in 
Venezuela under 
the mining 
concessions known 
as the “Brisas 
Concession” and 
the “Unicornio 
Concession” for the 
extraction of gold, 
copper and 
molybdenum.  
Claims arising out of the 
government's alleged 
deprivation of claimant's 
rights in certain gold and 
copper project in Venezuela, 
following the issuance of an 
administrative ruling by the 
Ministry of the Environment 
declaring the nullity of certain 
construction permit and the 
subsequent termination of 
claimant's mining 
concessions. 
USD 713 million 
Pac Rim Cayman 
LLC v. Republic of 
El Salvador 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/12) 
2009 El Salvador United States 
of America 
CAFTA ICSID In favor of 
the state 
Sole ownership of 
certain Salvadoran 
mining companies 
that held rights 
conferred by 
exploration licenses, 
authorizations and 
permits, including 
the right to a mining 
exploitation 
concession in the 
area known as "EI 
Dorado"; related 
capital 
expenditures.  
Claims arising out of the 
government's refusal to issue 
necessary mining licenses for 
Pacific Rim’s El Dorado gold 
mining project in northern El 
Salvador due to alleged 
environmental concerns 
including the company’s use 
of certain chemicals in the 
extraction process. 
N/A – investor’s/ 
investors’ claims 
rejected  
Bilcon of 
Delaware et al v. 
Government of 
Canada 
2008 Canada United States 
of America 
NAFTA UNCITRAL Pending Ownership and 
control of the 
Canadian company 
Bilcon of Nova 
Scotia and a lease 
agreement entered 
by this company for 
the property on 
which a quarry and 
marine terminal 
were to be 
developed.  
Claims arising out of the 
government's rejection of the 
investors' project to operate a 
quarry and marine terminal in 
the Canadian province of 
Nova Scotia, following a 
negative environmental 
assessment process. 
Case pending  
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Burlington 
Resources, Inc. v. 
Republic of 
Ecuador (ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB/08/5) 
2008 Ecuador United States 
of America 
United 
States-
Ecuador 
BIT 
ICSID Pending Rights under 
production sharing 
contracts for the 
exploration and 
exploitation of 
Blocks 7 and 21, 
concluded between 
a Burlington wholly-
owned subsidiary 
and Ecuador.  
Claims arising out of 
Ecuador's enactment of a law 
imposing a 99 per cent 
windfall levy on foreign oil 
revenues as a result of an oil 
spike starting in 2002, the 
government's decision to 
migrate to service contracts 
and the subsequent 
termination (caducidad) 
process to terminate the 
investor's production sharing 
agreements. 
Case pending  
Perenco Ecuador 
Limited v. 
Republic of 
Ecuador 
(Petroecuador) 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/6) 
2008 Ecuador Bahamas Ecuador-
France BIT 
ICSID Pending Sole operator and 
majority shareholder 
of rights in two oil 
blocks under two 
production sharing 
contracts concluded 
between Ecuador's 
oil company 
Petroecuador and 
several foreign 
investors; rights 
under joint 
operating 
agreements 
concluded with 
other entities 
holding interests in 
such blocks; 
contributions in 
personnel, 
equipment, 
technology, goods 
and services.  
Claims arising out of 
Ecuador's enactment of Law 
No. 42 imposing a 99 per 
cent windfall levy on foreign 
oil revenues that allegedly 
resulted in the expropriation 
of Perenco's investment in 
Blocks 7 and 21 situated in 
the Ecuadorian Amazon 
region; particularly by 
depriving Perenco of its 
contractual right to an agreed 
participation percentage of 
the crude oil produced in the 
Blocks. 
Case pending  
Mobil Investments 
Canada Inc. and 
Murphy Oil 
Corporation v. 
2007 Canada United States 
of America 
NAFTA ICSID AF In favor of 
the investor 
Indirect controlling 
shareholding in two 
companies, 
Hibernia 
Claims arising out of changes 
in the regulatory regime 
applicable to the exploitation 
of two oil fields located off the 
USD 13.9 million 
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Government of 
Canada (ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/4) 
Management and 
Development Co. 
and Terra Nova Oil 
Development 
Project, engaged in 
two petroleum 
development 
projects off the 
coast of the 
Province of 
Newfoundland and 
Labrador in 
Canada.  
coast of Newfoundland and 
Labrador in which the 
claimants had invested; 
particularly, the imposition of 
research and development 
expenditure requirements by 
the Canadian province of 
Newfoundland. 
Chevron 
Corporation and 
Texaco Petroleum 
Company v. The 
Republic of 
Ecuador (PCA 
Case No. 34877) 
2006 Ecuador United States 
of America 
US-
Ecuador 
BIT 
UNCITRAL In favor of 
the investor 
Oil exploration and 
production rights in 
Ecuador’s Amazon 
region through 
concession 
contracts concluded 
with the 
government.  
Claims arising out of seven 
breach-of-contract cases filed 
by Texaco against the 
Ecuadorian government in 
local courts and the alleged 
egregious delay of all Texaco 
claims by the Ecuadorian 
judiciary. 
USD 77.7 million 
Occidental 
Petroleum 
Corporation and 
Occidental 
Exploration and 
Production 
Company v. 
Republic of 
Ecuador (ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB/06/11) (II) 
2006 Ecuador United States 
of America 
Ecuador-
United 
States BIT 
ICSID In favor of 
the investor 
Participation 
contract for the 
exploration and 
exploitation of 
hydrocarbons.  
Claims arising out of the 
termination (caducidad) of a 
1999 participation contract 
between Occidental 
Exploration and Production 
Company and PetroEcuador 
for the exploration and 
exploitation of hydrocarbons 
in Block 15 of the Ecuadorian 
Amazon region. 
USD 1.8 billion28 
Hulley Enterprises 
Ltd. v. Russian 
Federation (PCA 
Case No. AA 226) 
2005 Russian 
Federation 
Cyprus Energy 
Charter 
Treaty 
UNCITRAL In favor of 
the investor 
Shareholding in the 
Russian-
incorporated Yukos 
Oil Company OJSC.  
Claims arising out of a series 
of actions undertaken by the 
respondent against Yukos Oil 
Company, including arrests, 
large tax assessments and 
USD 40 billion 
                                                 
28 This amount was reduced in annulment proceedings from an original award of USD 1.8 billion to USD 1.1 billion, plus interest. 
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liens, and the auction of the 
main Yukos facilities, among 
others, which allegedly led to 
the bankruptcy of the 
company and eliminated all 
value of claimant's shares in 
Yukos. 
Veteran 
Petroleum Limited 
v. The Russian 
Federation (PCA 
Case No. AA 228) 
2005 Russian 
Federation 
Cyprus Energy 
Charter 
Treaty 
UNCITRAL In favor of 
the investor 
Shareholding in the 
Russian-
incorporated Yukos 
Oil Company OJSC.  
Claims arising out of a series 
of actions undertaken by the 
respondent against Yukos Oil 
Company, including arrests, 
large tax assessments and 
liens, and the auction of the 
main Yukos facilities, among 
others, which allegedly led to 
the bankruptcy of the 
company and eliminated all 
value of claimant's shares in 
Yukos. 
USD 8.2 billion 
Yukos Universal 
Limited (Isle of 
Man) v. The 
Russian 
Federation (PCA 
Case No. AA 227) 
2005 Russian 
Federation 
United 
Kingdom 
Energy 
Charter 
Treaty 
UNCITRAL In favor of 
the investor 
Shareholding in the 
Russian-
incorporated Yukos 
Oil Company OJSC.  
Claims arising out of a series 
of actions undertaken by the 
respondent against Yukos Oil 
Company, including arrests, 
large tax assessments and 
liens, and the auction of the 
main Yukos facilities, among 
others, which allegedly led to 
the bankruptcy of the 
company and eliminated all 
value of claimant's shares in 
Yukos. 
USD 1.8 billion 
Ioannis 
Kardassopoulos v. 
Georgia (ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB/05/18)29 
2005 Georgia Greece Georgia-
Greece 
BIT; Energy 
Charter 
Treaty 
ICSID In favor of 
the investor 
Co-ownership of a 
Panamanian 
company that had 
executed a joint 
venture agreement 
with a state-owned 
Claims arising out of a 
government's decree 
cancelling the concession 
rights of an investment 
vehicle, in which Mr. Ioannis 
Kardassopoulos and Mr. Ron 
USD 15.1 million 
                                                 
29 UNCTAD classifies this case under the “Transportation and storage” sector.  
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company and 
created a joint 
venture vehicle that 
held a Deed of 
Concession over 
certain oil and gas 
pipelines in 
Georgia. 
Fuchs held interests, devoted 
to the development of an oil 
pipeline to transport oil and 
gas from Azerbaijan to the 
Black Sea. 
Vannessa 
Ventures Ltd v. 
Bolivarian 
Republic of 
Venezuela (ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/6) 
2004 Venezuela, 
Bolivarian 
Republic of 
Canada Canada-
Venezuela 
BIT 
ICSID AF In favor of 
the state 
Majority 
shareholding in a 
company holding a 
mining concession 
for gold and copper.  
Claims arising out of the 
government's retraction of 
claimant's mining rights in Las 
Cristinas in the south east of 
Venezuela, one of the world’s 
greatest undeveloped 
sources of gold, under the 
allegation that claimant's 
purchase of the shares was 
illegal. 
N/A – investor’s/ 
investors’ claims 
rejected 
Glamis Gold Ltd. 
v. United States of 
America 
2003 United States 
of America 
Canada NAFTA UNCITRAL In favor of 
the state 
Publicly-held 
corporation 
engaged in the 
mining of precious 
metals.  
Claims arising out of certain 
federal government actions 
and California state measures 
regarding open-pit mining 
operations, allegedly resulting 
in injuries to a proposed gold 
mine in Imperial County, 
California. 
N/A – investor’s/ 
investors’ claims 
rejected 
Occidental 
Exploration and 
Production 
Company v. 
Republic of 
Ecuador (LCIA 
Case No. 
UN3467) (I) 
2002 Ecuador United States 
of America 
Ecuador-
United 
States BIT 
UNCITRAL In favor of 
the investor 
Rights under a 
participation 
contract for the 
exploration and 
exploitation of 
hydrocarbons.  
Claims arising out of 
resolutions issued by the 
Ecuadorian tax authority 
denying applications for VAT 
refunds by Occidental, and 
requiring the return of the 
amounts previously 
reimbursed in connection with 
a participation contract 
entered into by the claimant 
with Petroecuador, a state-
owned corporation of 
Ecuador, to undertake oil 
USD 71.5 million 
  
21 
 
exploration and production in 
Ecuador. 
PSEG Global Inc. 
and Konya Ilgin 
Elektrik Üretim ve 
Ticaret Limited 
Sirketi v. Republic 
of Turkey (ICSID 
Case No. 
ARB/02/5)30 
2002 Turkey United States 
of America 
Turkey-
United 
States BIT 
ICSID In favor of 
the investor 
Rights and 
expectations under 
a contract for the 
construction of a 
mine and power 
plant; assets of 
project company, 
including associated 
intangible property, 
licenses and 
permits. 
Claims arising out of several 
disagreements concerning a 
contract with the government 
for the construction of mine 
and associated power plant. 
USD 9 million 
 
                                                 
30 UNCTAD classifies this case under the “Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply” sector.  The authors of this paper have changed the descriptions of the investment and case from what was included in 
UNCTAD’s database.  
